Founded in 1986, the National Congress of Vietnamese Americans is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit community advocacy organization working to advance the cause of Vietnamese Americans in a plural but united America – e pluribus unum – by participating actively and fully as civic minded citizens engaged in the areas of education, culture and civil liberties.

Doi Moi and A New Foreign Policy

A major reorientation of Vietnam’s foreign policy took place in 1988 when Vietnam decided to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, adopted a “multidirectional foreign policy, declared its intention to join ASEAN, and participate in the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement on Cambodia in 1991.^[ii] The objective of this move was to extricate Vietnam from diplomatic and economic isolation so that it could focus on economic development to regain legitimacy for the CPV, which had been tarnished after years of mismanagement and as a result of the failure of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This reorientation was reaffirmed by the Seventh National Congress of the CPV in 1991 and enshrined in the Constitution of 1992. In the new Constitution, “close and total cooperation” with the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia and other socialist countries was replaced by “friendly solidarity and cooperation” with neighboring and socialist countries. This means that Vietnam wanted to reorient its diplomatic relations away from the Soviet bloc toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and to focus more on regional cooperation and less on “revolutionary duty.” Vietnamese leaders and diplomats began to talk about the diversification and multilateralization of diplomatic relations. Vietnam wanted to be friends with every nation. True to this principle, Vietnam opened its doors to the Western market democracies but held on to its long-time socialist friends, including the pariahs to the West, such as Cuba, North Korea, and Iraq. On the one hand, Vietnam formed close relations with China, adhered to one-China policy, and committed in an agreement with China in 1991 not to establish any forms of official relations or any “contact of an official nature” with Taiwan. On the other hand, it cultivated economic and trade relations with Taiwan, which eventually became the second largest investor in Vietnam.

In 1994, the Midterm Party Congress warned of four dangers facing Vietnam – the dangers of falling behind, deviation from socialism, bureaucratism and corruption, and “peaceful evolution.” These dangers, the party admitted at the 11^th Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPV in Hanoi in January 2001, “still exist and develop in complicated fashion. They are linked and intertwined together.” ^[iii] How to overcome these dangers posed a challenge to Vietnam’s foreign policy. To avoid falling behind other countries in the region in terms of economic development, Vietnam must move toward a market economy, open the country to the West, and face the danger of socialist deviation and “peaceful evolution.” But the policy of self-reliance and collective self-reliance, popular among radical leaders in the Third World countries in the 1970’s, provided no realistic alternative to Vietnam in the 1990’s as the Third World was in disarray and the communist bloc had largely disintegrated. Vietnam opted to open to the West and make the necessary compromises to attract foreign aid and investment, but at the same time tried to minimize the negative impact of Western influence and demands. CPV General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh, known as the Little Gorbachev of Vietnam, once remarked, “We must open the window to get fresh air, but the flies can get in. We get fresh air and we swat the flies.” In the beginning Vietnam adopted an open door policy to support economic development. Since the signing of the U.S.-Vietnamese Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam was prepared to take a further step. Its leaders began to talk about “economic integration” and joining the World Trade Organization.

Vietnam’s foreign policy goals and dilemmas are reflected in Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien’s press conference on April 20 and his address to the Ninth Congress of the CPV on April 22, 2001. Among the objectives of Vietnam’s foreign policy he listed “national independence and sovereignty, . . . creation of favorable international conditions for accelerated socioeconomic development, . . .construction and development of the fatherland, . . . struggle for democracy and socialism.” The tasks he set for Vietnam’s diplomacy indicate policy dilemma and difficulty of choice. One the one hand, Vietnam must “broaden friendship and cooperation with all countries, international and regional organization, major political and economic centers.” One the other, it has to “fight all attempts and acts of peaceful evolution, outside pressure, imposition and hegemony.” In another task, Nien said Vietnam must “actively integrate in the world, first of all economic integration.... while ... firmly maintain independence, self reliance, socialist orientation, national interest, national security.”

Thus, Vietnam’s foreign policy is characterized by inherent tension and defensiveness.

Vietnam wants to have close relations with the United States to gain a vast source of investment capital and technology, a potential market for Vietnam’s product, and a possible counterweight to the rising power of China, but it is afraid of American influence and the danger of “peaceful evolution” plotted by “hostile forces” in America and the West.

Vietnam needs to identify itself with China, the largest remaining communist country, for economic and political support and to learn from its experience of economic reform without abandoning socialism, but it fears Chinese ambition and domination.

Russia is a traditional ally, a sentimental attachment, and can be a trusted protector, but it has neither the financial resources nor the military capability the former Soviet Union once had.

The European Community is sympathetic to Vietnam, but it does not have America’s clouds. India is a traditional and loyal friend, and Japan is the biggest source of official development aid, but neither is a match for China, a major Vietnam’s security concern.

Vietnam is comfortable with ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. While Vietnam has made great stride in integrating and playing a major role in the ASEAN system, ASEAN has its own limitations. ASEAN is a diverse group of countries that are greatly different from one another in terms of political systems and levels of social and economic development. The group is weak militarily, and has lost its economic luster since the 1997 financial crisis. It has proved to be unable to address key regional security issues as evidenced by the failure of the Asian Regional Forum to adopt a code of conduct in the South China Sea in July 2001.

Vietnam is the dominant player in Indochina. While it has excellent relations with Laos, it has some problems in her relations with Cambodia mostly caused by territorial disputes and Cambodian nationalist sentiment against past and present Vietnam’s behavior. This, however, does not present a big problem for Vietnam’s foreign policy. How to deal with the major powers is a major concern of Vietnam’s policy makers.

Vietnam and the Major Powers

Three powers that loom large in Vietnam’s foreign policy horizon are China, Russia, and the United States. Their capabilities and behaviors set the parameters of Vietnamese foreign policy.

Vietnam and China

Sino-Vietnamese relations are influenced by many conflicting factors --traditional hostility and mutual need, territorial disputes and a shared ideology. During the First and throughout most of the Second Indochina War, the Democratic Republic of [North] Vietnam (DRV) and China had relations that were close as “lips and teeth.” China was a main supporter of the DRV in her struggle against France and the United States. After the Second Indochina War, territorial disputes, conflict over Vietnam’s treatment of the overseas Chinese in Vietnam, and the war in Cambodia turned the two former allies into bitter enemies. For ten years, between 1979 and 1989, Vietnam and China faced each other over the Cambodian War.

The process of rapprochement between the two countries took place after Vietnam completed its troops withdrawal from Cambodia. It started with General Secretary of the CPV Nguyen Van Linh’s unannounced trip to Chengdu in 1990, followed by the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991, the firing of foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach who was considered by China as being too close to the United States, and a series of trips to China by two newly elected top Vietnamese leaders, Do Muoi who replaced Linh as CPV General Secretary in 1991 and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. These symbolic gestures to placate China finally led to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1991. 1991 was also the year when the Soviet Union, the “cornerstone of Vietnam’s foreign policy” disintegrated, the Soviet bloc dissipated, and the Cold War was over, Vietnam and China were two of only four communist regimes that survived in a completely changed world. They felt the need to sink or swim together.

China is interested in helping Vietnam remain communist, having a friendly if not docile neighbor to the South, and denying any potential hostile power access to Vietnam. Tying Vietnam to China through a web of relationships is an important goal of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao told the press in Hanoi on April 20, 2001, “China is willing to join hands with Vietnam in the new century to push bilateral traditional friendship to a new height and open up a brighter future for the relationship between the two parties and the two countries.”^[iv]

Vietnam considers China a model of development, a big neighbor that should not be antagonized. Vietnam also needs China for ideological and economic support. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai said at a New Year press conference on January 2, 1999 that Vietnam considered Sino-Vietnamese relations “an important factor for Vietnam’s development, because of the similarities between the two countries and their joint desire to promote investment and trade relations.” Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien reiterated at a press conference on April 20, 2001 that developing relations with China was “a priority in the foreign policy of the CPV,” adding “Vietnam and China are two socialist countries that have long tradition of friendship and China is a neighboring country which is very friendly with Vietnam.”^[v] General Secretary Le Kha Phieu, in an interview with China’s Economic Review, said he wanted to study “China’s valuable experience gained during its process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.”^[vi] To the General Secretary of the CPV, the Chinese model was so crucial to the survival of the CPV that he confessed, “If China succeeds in its economic reform, then we’ll succeed. If China fails, we’ll fail.”^[vii] This need to look to China as a source of ideological inspiration after the collapse of the former Soviet Union was echoed by Vietnamese Communist Party ideology and culture chief Nguyen Khoa Diem when he told Li Peng, chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress, that China had accumulated “valuable experiences in ethical and cultural construction, which Vietnam is eager to learn,” and that the VCP paid great attention to the “Three Representations” theory expounded by Chinese President Jiang Zemin.^[viii]

Since 1991, relations between Vietnam and China have steadily improved, their ties expanded. Bilateral trade increased from 30 million in 1991 to 1 billion in 1998 and 2 billion in 2000. Both sided pledged to increase this volume to 5 billion by 2005. China is now Vietnam’s fifth largest trading partner. Party and government officials as well as military officers of both countries have made hundreds of visits to each other’s country and held numerous working sessions and seminars to promote cooperation. These efforts culminated in a visit by CPV General Secretary Le Kha Phieu to China in 1999 when he and Chinese President Jiang Zemin committed the two nations to follow “the chosen path of socialism” and to sign a land border by the end of 1999 and to delineate the Tonkin Gulf in 2000. The two leaders also pledged to develop ties on the principles of “long-term stability, orientation towards the future, good neighborliness and friendship and all-round cooperation.” By the time Nong Duc Manh, Phieu’s successor, visited China from November 30 to December 2, 2001, the promised agreements to delineate borders on land and in the Tonkin Gulf had been signed. In a joint statement, leaders of both countries agreed to maintain “the fine tradition of high-level exchanges between the two parties and the two countries,” and pledged to promote exchange and cooperation “between offices and branches of the Parties, Governments, National Assemblies, mass organizations, and localities of the two countries in political, culture, and education fields.”^[ix] Manh considered his trip to China “a historic visit” which has “elevated Vietnam-China relations to a new higher level.”^[x] During Jiang Zemin’s visit to Vietnam between February 27 and March 1, 2002, the Chinese President highlighted five areas for “all-round development” of bilateral ties in the new millennium: high-level exchanges and contact; expanded trade and economic cooperation; education of the people in the spirit of long-term friendship; stronger bilateral cooperation over outstanding border issues; and greater shared experience to improve the external environment for both countries’ development and construction.^[xi]

Unlike Vietnam’s relations with other powers, Vietnam’s relations with China are comprehensive and multifaceted. They go beyond state-to-state relations to also include party-to-party, province-to-province, and people-to-people relations. Party leaders tied their two countries together in a web of relationships between governments, parties, and mass organizations, from the central government down to the local level. In the last decade, no other country has sent more top leaders and delegations of all sizes and levels to Vietnam than China, and vice versa.

Below this surface of close relations, there was a certain uneasiness on the part of Vietnam about Chinese growing military power and its behavior towards the disputed territories. While Vietnam could not do much about the rising Chinese power, and attempts have been made to reach agreements, at least on paper, on the demarcation of land and sea boundaries between the two countries, Vietnam’s unhappiness over Chinese encroachment and territorial disputes over the offshore islands remain a source of contention between the two countries.

The Paracels

China took the Paracels from the Republic of (South) Vietnam in 1974, one year after all American troops had withdrawn from South Vietnam. Because of its dependence on Chinese aid and support during the Vietnam War, North Vietnam acquiesced to the Chinese position on the Sino-Vietnamese borders and did not protest against Chinese action on the Paracels. When the war was over, Vietnam began to stake its traditional claim on the Paracels. It protested and objected every time China took measures to make Chinese occupation of the Paracels a fait accompli. In 1997, Vietnam protested vehemently when China reveals plans to turn the Paracels into a tourist place, and again in 1998 when China granted Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO) oil and gas exploration rights in waters Vietnam claimed between Hainan Island and Vietnam coast. On May 25, 2001, Guangzhou Radio announced that China would mark off a forbidding sea area covering coordinates between 14 degree 30’ and 17 degree 00 to the North and between 111 degree 30’ and 114 degree 00 to the East for military exercises from 0:00 hour on May 27 to 24:00 hour on June 23. Vietnamese Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman Phan Thuy Thanh took issue with Chinese action and asserted that the area “totally belongs to Vietnam’s Paracels archipelago and its continental shelf in the East Sea.” She also added that Vietnam had sufficient evidence and historical and legal grounds to affirm its indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. “Any move by any other country towards Vietnam’s two archipelagos as well as its exclusive economic zones and continental shelves without the Vietnamese government’s permit is a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and its sovereign rights over these areas.”^[xii]

In the case of the Paracels, China has used force to take over territory that Vietnam considered theirs for hundreds of years, under circumstances that Vietnamese communist leaders could do nothing to prevent. While the Vietnamese could not physically dislodge the Chinese from the Paracels, they continued to make verbal protests against Chinese occupation. At present, China has physical possession of the Paracels, but its sovereignty over the islands is and will always be challenged by Vietnam.

The Spratlys

The Spratlys includes about 230 islets, reefs and atolls. The entire surface is three square miles but half of the world’s merchant traffic by tonnage passes through the Spratlys, two-thirds of it crude oil. The islands were claimed by Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Both China and Vietnam claim “indisputable sovereignty” over all of the Spratlys and both said that disputes must be solved by negotiations. There are, however, subtle differences. While China prefers bilateral negotiations, Vietnam is receptive to multilateral negotiations and “in accordance with UN conventions.” Vietnam, believing in the validity of historical evidence in favor of claims, is open to a settlement based on international law and conventions. China, because of its military advantage, insists on a political solution of the disputes. While Vietnam suggests that the parties concerned should “maintain stability on the basis of the status quo and self-restraint and should refrain from actions that would further complicate the situation,” China proposed joint exploration on the basis of China’s “indisputable sovereignty,” and has made several moves to expand and consolidate areas under its control leading to tension and conflict between the two countries.

In 1992, China signed an agreement with U.S.-based Crestone Energy Corporation to explore the areas off the disputed Spratly islands. Vietnam protested and signed up U.S.-based Conoco to explore the same zone. In March 1997, China built a platform in waters claimed by Vietnam. Under pressure from ASEAN, it removed the platform. In 1998, a sea battle was fought over the Johnson Reef in which 70 Vietnamese sailors died. As the Chinese navy gained strength, China was becoming more assertive. In the past, China insisted that new structures she built on the disputed islands were only meant for fishing, not for military use. Suddenly, in April 2000, Chinese media released a report about the “living conditions and logistical supplies” of Chinese stationed in the Spratlys which claimed that the island were now outfitted with new and improved helicopter pads, weaponry, reconnaissance equipment and concrete shelters “all for use by the PLA.”^[xiii]

Vietnam responded by assertive actions of its own. On February 9, 2001 when visiting Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian was meeting with CPV’s General Secretary Le Kha Phieu in Hanoi, the Sai Gon Giai Phong daily reported a meeting of Vietnamese officials on the same day to discuss the defense of the Spratly islands in which they supported plans to set up “governmental bodies” for the islands.^[xiv] This report, of course, was met with “serious concern” by the Chinese^[xv] The following month, a front page article in the Lao Dong newspaper said that Vietnam Archeological Institute had discovered many Vietnamese ceramics from the 13^th and 14^th centuries on the Truong Sa Lon (Big Spratly) island during an excavations from 1996-2000. This, the editorial asserted, “confirms the early and continuous presence of the Vietnamese on the [Spratly] archipelago. ^[xvi]Again, in April when Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao led a high-level delegation to Hanoi to attend the Ninth National Congress of the CPV, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien affirmed that Vietnam would continue to expand its economic and military efforts in the South China Sea. The ten-year socioeconomic development strategy adopted by the Party Congress outlined a policy “to move actively toward the sea and control the territorial seas,” and to “build logistic bases in a number of islands for forward movement into the open seas.”^[xvii]

Recent efforts to control conflicts over the islands by setting up a code of conduct in the South China Sea failed when participants to the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2001 could not agree on a draft presented by the Philippines.

Land and Sea Borders

Vietnam and China share 1,350 kilometers of land border, and the territorial waters of both countries overlap in the Gulf of Tonkin. The land border between two countries and border demarcation in the Gulf of Tonkin were agreed upon in the 1887 and 1895 conventions between France and the Chinese Court during the time Vietnam was under French control. China considers all agreements signed by the Manchu’s with Western nations “unequal treaties” that need to be abrogated or revised. She was not happy with the old demarcation of land and sea boundaries between China and Vietnam, and pressed for new agreements.

In 1979, Vietnam and China fought a brief border war and Chinese troops advanced into Vietnam. When the war ended, Chinese troops withdrew, but not from all the lands it occupied. China retained control of a spread of land at the border from 200 meters to 3,000 meters deep into Vietnam’s territory. After Vietnam and China normalized their diplomatic relations, border negotiations started in 1992. On December 30, 1999. After seven years and twenty rounds of negotiations, a “historic agreement” on land border was signed between the two countries. While China expressed satisfaction, there was clear evidence that Vietnam was not too happy. Despite the fact that the anticipated agreement on land border could not be concluded by the end of Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Vietnam in early December, Chinese media claimed that “all problems relating to land demarcation between the two countries had been solved” while the Vietnamese side insisted, “some technical matters still needed to be settled.”^[xviii]

The Chinese set the target for the signing of an agreement on the Tonkin Gulf in 2000 and, again, just a few days before the deadline, on December 25, 2000, the Tonkin Gulf agreement concerning the demarcation of the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zones of two sides and an agreement on fishing were signed. It was signed on the first day of Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong visited to China. The text has not been made public. The Paris-based Thong Luan monthly reported that Hanoi intellectuals were concerned that Vietnam had been forced to make many concessions. Sources from within the CPV said General Secretary Le Kha Phieu faced hostile questioning about the two agreements during the recent Party congress. It was suspected that Vietnamese leaders had ceded to China between 400 to 720 square kilometers of land territory, and accepted Chinese demand to a share of 46/54 of the Tonkin Gulf instead of 38/62 as had been agreed with France before, resulting in a purported loss of another 10,000 square kilometers.^[xix] This concern has prompted Le Chi Quang, a lawyer in Hanoi, to write an open letter on October 1, 2001 urging Vietnamese leaders to be “vigilant over Chinese schemes.”^[xx] On November 28, 2001, twenty “voters” representing both North and South Vietnam, including many veterans of the CPV and prominent dissidents, wrote an open letter to the country’s leaders accusing the government of making too much territorial concessions to China when it signed the Sino-Vietnamese border agreements. The petitioners requested that the National Assembly open a debate on those agreements and reject them.

According to government sources, negotiations between the two countries were long and intense, Vietnamese negotiators at the technical level fought long and hard to protect the country’s interests against Chinese demands. In the end, trade-offs had to be made. On land, the Chinese were given half of the picturesque Ban Gioc Fall and the strategic Phu Tu heights, which they had taken in 1979 and would not give up. Vietnam also accepted that the Nam Quan Gate (or Friendship Gate) belonged to China and was 200 meters within Chinese territory. In the Gulf of Tonkin, the old demarcation line was modified. Instead of dividing the Gulf of Tonkin into half from coast-to-coast (Hainan to Quang Ninh) as China initially demanded, the Chinese agreed to settle for a half of the sea area from island-to-island (Hainan to Con Co). That formula gave Vietnam 53.23 percent of the sea area, avoiding a possible loss of about 20,000 square kilometers. Vietnamese negotiators believed they got the best possible deal under the circumstances and, given Chinese ambitions and growing power, further delay in clinching a deal with China might result in more territorial losses. Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung, in an interview with the official news agency VASC Orient, claimed that the treaties were fair and they were concluded in order to provide a stable environment for economic development and good neighborly relations between the two countries.^[xxi]

The settlement of territorial disputes reflects the unequal nature of Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Conflicting claims over the Paracel and Spratly islands remain a source of tension between the two countries. Despite all of this, Vietnam is under Chinese pressure to revise textbooks to delete anti-Chinese feeling and emphasize China’ s help for Vietnam during the war.

Vietnam and Russia

To Vietnamese leaders, the Soviet Union was the cradle of socialist revolution and the leader of international communism. It was a major supporter of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and the sole supporter of Vietnam after the Sino-Vietnamese border war (1979) and during the Cambodian war (1979-91). Relations between the two countries cooled off when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the communists lost control of Russia. Bilateral relations improved toward the end of the Yeltsin presidency. In 1998, Vietnam’s president Tran Duc Luong visited Russia and signed a joint statement with Russian president Boris Yeltsin on August 25 committing to boost bilateral cooperation between the two countries which, they believed, was due to reach the level of “strategic partnership.”

Relations between the two countries warmed up considerably during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. In September 2000, a major hurdle in their bilateral relations was overcome when an agreement settling the debt problem of Vietnam was reached. In March 2001, the Vladivostok-Hai Phong-Ho Chi Minh City-Vladivostok line was reopened for cargo traffic. By July, both sides were talking about plans to create a free trade zone to boost bilateral economic cooperation. Vietnamese charge d’affairs in Moscow Vu Xuan Quang told Tass that relations between two countries had “notably increased over the past few years and it is now possible to speak about the establishment of strategic partnership between the two countries,” and that “cooperation with Russia in such field as extraction of oil and gas, power engineering, personnel training, science and technology makes substantive contribution to the cause of economic renovation, industrialization and modernization of Vietnam.”^[xxii] President Putin was the first top Russian leader to visit Vietnam in February 2001. Before leaving Russia for Vietnam, he declared bilateral cooperation between the two nations had reached the level of “strategic partnership.”^[xxiii]

While the concept of “strategic partnership” was never applied to Sino-Vietnamese relations, it was repeated over and over by Vietnamese leaders when they talked about Vietnam relations with Russia and with the former Soviet republics such as Belarus and Ukraine. Vietnam feels some affinity towards its traditional allies and supporters and does not feel threatened by them as it feels toward China and the United States. Vietnam also believes that relations with Russia and the former Soviet republics can bring practical benefits to Vietnam. While Russia can provide investment capitals and train Vietnamese personnel, and has helped Vietnam build oil refineries and power plants even in places where Western companies refused to invest, Ukraine has promised to help in shipbuilding and modernizing the Vietnamese navy.^[xxiv] Moreover, Russia can also serve somewhat as a counter-balance to Chinese power. During his visit to Vietnam, president Putin said Russia was ready to help Vietnam to modernize its army and provide Vietnam with new and modern technology.^[xxv] Vietnamese president Tran Duc Luong told Russian media that Vietnam considered Russia its “strategic partner” in the Asia-Pacific region and hoped Russia’s influence would strengthen peace and stability in the region.^[xxvi] Luong’s position was echoed by Prime Minister Phan Van Khai when he said, in an interview with Russian RTR Television on February 27, 20001, that “Russia could play an important role in consolidating peace and stability” in the Asian region.^[xxvii] A year later, General Secretary Nong Duc Manh repeated this theme when he told visiting Russian Deputy Prime Minister V.B. Khristenko in Hanoi in January 2002 that Vietnam would do its best to develop its “strategic partnership” with Russia, particularly in the economic, cultural, scientific-technical, educational and training areas.”^[xxviii]

There are, however, limits to what Russia could do fulfill a strategic role in Asia to meet the expectation and hope of Vietnam. First, while economic exchange between Vietnam and Russia has improved, the volume of trade between the two countries remains relatively small, at about $550 million in 2001. This prompted Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to complain that trade between Vietnam and Russia is “several times smaller than Vietnam’s turnover with China or Japan.”^[xxix] The decision to move out of Cam Ranh Bay by the Russian navy by July 1, 2002, two years before its lease expires will reduce Russian capability to be a major player in the South China Sea area. Russian Defense Minister admitted as such when he wrote to the Duma’s Defense Committee explaining the decision to relinquish the Cam Ranh Bay that, with the reduction of Russia’s armed forces, maintaining permanent presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean is “insupportable in material terms and unnecessary in realistic terms.” ^[xxx]

Vietnam and the United States

Vietnam and the United States were protagonists during both the Vietnam War and the Cambodian War. This unfortunate experience has left a bitter taste in both countries. This was clearly evidenced in the heated exchange between General Secretary Le Kha Phieu and President Bill Clinton during the latter’s “historic” visit to Vietnam in November 2000.

After the end of the Vietnam War, the Carter administration made an attempt at reconciliation and began talks to normalize diplomatic relations with Vietnam. The negotiations failed due to Vietnam’s intransigence and its awkward attempt to exploit American war guilt to extract excessive concessions from the United States. The process was renewed under the Reagan administration beginning with the negotiations for Vietnam’s cooperation on the search for Americans missing during the Vietnam War (MIA’s). In the process, the United States gave Vietnam a “road map” specifying steps to be taken toward full normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The pace of normalization quickened after the end of the Cambodian War. The first American office to conduct MIA search was opened in Hanoi in 1991. American trade embargo against Vietnam was lifted in 1994. Full diplomatic relations was established in 1995. Two countries exchanged ambassadors in 1997. In July 2000, a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement (BTA) was signed and Secretary Colin Powell became the highest US military officer to visit Vietnam since the end of the war, followed by a visit of Bill Clinton, the first American president to visit Vietnam since 1969. By October 2001, both houses of Congress had ratified the agreement. On December 10, the agreement took effect after exchange of letters of approval during the visit to the United States of a high-level Vietnamese delegation headed by Permanent Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.

For Vietnam, good relations with the United States are the key to the support of international financial institutions, and western investment and aid. It may also give Vietnamese goods access to the huge American market. Vietnam cannot develop rapidly without the support of the United States. Furthermore, the United States is the only logical solution to Vietnam’s security concern vis-a-vis China and a potential ally against Chinese aggressive move in the South China Sea. This, however, is not a practical choice for the CPV. Vietnamese communist leaders are not comfortable with US stance on the issues of human rights and democratization, and they fear US plots of “peaceful evolution” that could end communist rule in Vietnam. Moreover, they do not want to antagonize China by being too close to the United States. These considerations are reflected in Vietnam’s approach to the United States.

While Vietnam has been reluctant to promote any kind of military arrangement with the United States, it has sought defense cooperation with Russia, India, South Korea, and Japan. Vietnam signed an agreement on military cooperation with Russia on July 2, 2000 for continued military aid and training. It signed with South Korea an agreement providing for a conference between defense ministers and a visit of South Korean cruise ship on October 2, 2000. It agreed in May 2000 to hold regular meetings to discuss security issues with Japan and talked with Japan about cooperation on search and rescue operations for civilian ships in the South China Sea. In September 2000, Vietnam joined India in the Gange-Mekong project to promote cooperation among countries in the two regions and expressed interest in “cooperation in the security arena” with India.

The Russian decision to leave Cam Ranh Bay by July 1, 2000 opened up an opportunity for military cooperation between Vietnam and the United States. In his visit to Vietnam in early February 2002, Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, said the U.S was interested in closer military ties with Vietnam, and that it was time for both countries to “transition and look more to the missions of the future.” While making clear that the U.S. was not looking for permanent bases, Blair specifically expressed American interest to have Cam Ranh become an “open port” to allow ships from all nations to visit after the Russian navy pull out. ^[xxxi] Vietnam’s response to this entreaty was one of caution, but not complete rejection. On the one hand, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Vietnam would not sign an agreement with any country on using Cam Ranh port for military purpose and Vietnam’s Defense Minister, General Pham Van Tra, categorically said the Cam Ranh would not be leased to the United States after Russian withdrawal,^[xxxii] On the other hand, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung declared that Blair’s visit was “an important step in accelerating the multifaceted cooperation between Vietnam and the United States.” He suggested that Vietnamese and American armies could cooperate with each other in fighting against drug trafficking and terrorism, and in the field of mine and unexploded munitions clearance.^[xxxiii]

In its relations with the United States, Vietnamese leaders have to pay attention to Chinese sensitivity and dare not bypass the Chinese. William Cohen was the first US defense secretary to visit Vietnam in March 2000, but his trip was delayed twice and, before he arrived in Vietnam, CPV General Secretary Le Kha Phieu had made an unannounced visit to China to meet CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin.^[xxxiv] Again, in July 2000, amid mounting expectation that Hanoi was about to sign a trade deal with the United States, Ho Chi Minh City party chief Nguyen Minh Triet was invited to lead a high-level delegation for a ten-day visit to China. Vietnam could have signed a BTA with the United States in September the previous year, but it backed down at the last minute, allowing China to sign the WTO trade deal with the United States first. In December 2001, when Vietnamese Permanent Deputy Minister Nguyen Tan Dung lead a high-ranking delegation to visit the United States to witness the official signing of the BTA, he took care to precede it with a visit to Cuba, and only after the new General Secretary of the CPV Nong Duc Manh made his first visit to China from November 30 to December 4. Again, when Jiang Zemin made a good-will visit to Vietnam in February 2002 on the hell of the visit of Admiral Blair, commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific who had expressed American interest in close military ties with Vietnam, including the use of Cam Ranh as a “open port” for all ships when Russia pulled out, the Chinese President was able to extract a statement from CPV General Secretary Nong Duc Manh that Vietnam would not allow any foreign country to use its naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.^[xxxv]

Hanoi’s fear of peaceful evolution provoked by the United States and resentment against U.S. support of Vietnamese dissidents and its criticism of its human rights violations are very real. From the time of president Clinton’s visit to Vietnam in November 2000 who told CNN in an interview before leaving Vietnam that “the trend toward freedom is virtually irreversible” to the time when the Ninth National Congress of the CPV met in April 2001, the army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, repeatedly warned against plots of peaceful evolution. The morning Clinton flew back to Washington, DC, Lt. General Le Van Dung, chief of staff of the Vietnamese People’s Army, warned in a front page article of the newspaper that “hostile forces... fighting against us actively sabotage socialism and the leading role of the CPV,” and pledged that the military was “determined to crush the threat of ‘peaceful evolution’ before it got off the ground.”^[xxxvi] Two months later, in its first issue of the New Year, Quan Doi Nhan Dan’s editorial was more strident and blunt. It said, “As far as we know, the imperialists led by the Americans and other hostile forces have never forsaken their ruthlessness in sabotaging socialism and revolutionary movements in the world ... The culprits who cause wars are none other than the imperialists led by the Americans. Their sole and ultimate aim is to eliminate socialism and interfering to force other nations to follow the orbit of capitalism.”^[xxxvii]

In February and March 2001, unrest occurred in the Central Highlands of Vietnam resulting from mass demonstrations over land disputes and religious freedom. Harsh handling of the crisis prompted criticism of Vietnam human rights records in the United States. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom accused Hanoi of “grievous violation” of the liberty of worship and called upon the secretaries of State and Treasury to withdraw all non-humanitarian lending to Vietnam. Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Dinh Bin delivered a warning to U.S. ambassador Pete Peterson asking the U.S. to “end its interference in Vietnam’s internal affairs.” Vietnamese authorities also rejected request of Ambassador Peterson to visit the region. Quan Doi Nhan Dan slammed the U.S. for “abusing its self proclaimed duty and responsibility [to champion democracy, human rights and religious freedom] in a well attested interference in our internal affairs.” It was joined by the party’s mouthpiece, Nhan Dan, which accused Washington of “inciting and encouraging” the disturbances on the highlands, and for “pushing a hard-line foreign policy which abuses human rights to impose US hegemony.”^[xxxviii]

But not everyone in Vietnam is stridently anti-American. Voice of reason could be found among those leaders who are responsible for economic development and diplomacy. Shortly after the publication of these editorials, Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien, at a news conference on April 20, hailed the BTA as meeting the interests of both sides and said while the United States and Vietnam were divergent on human rights and ethnic issues, Vietnam was willing to discuss human rights with the United States “at official level.” He explained “ We have many times said no state has the right to give judgment on other states. But now the world is moving to more openness and we should be ready to carry out our dialogue in good will.”^[xxxix] When US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific James Kelly visited Vietnam in May 2000, Nien told him that Vietnam wanted to continue promoting Vietnam-United States cooperation, but this cooperation must be based on the principle of “respect for each other’s independence and sovereignty, non-interference, equality and cooperation for mutual benefits.”^[xl]

While the human rights issues will continue to be a source of friction between Washington and Hanoi, Vietnam puts great importance in trade relations with the United States and expects to benefit from them. Since the lifting of the US trade embargo, trade between Vietnam and the United States has expanded from a mere $222 million in 1994 to $450 million in 1995, $935 million in 1996, and $1.12 billion in 2000. The signing of the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement opened a new era in U.S.-Vietnam relations. Vietnam’s Trade Minister Vu Khoan hoped that implementation of the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement could double or triple the volume of trade between the two countries next year. Permanent Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was more expansive when he spoke of the impact of the BTA on U.S.-Vietnam relations. He hailed, “The coming into effect of the BTA marks the full normalization of our bilateral relations and opens up new prospects for the expansion of the relations of trade-economic, culture, science and technology, education and training. It also helps strengthen the bilateral political and diplomatic relations and is instrumental to both sides’ efforts in actively addressing humanitarian issues left behind by the past.” ^[xli]

Not every one in Vietnam believed in the salutary impact of the trade agreement. Nhan Dan, the Party’s newspaper, warned in an editorial on November 29, 2001 that the BTA “presents our country with many difficulties and challenges. A major challenge is that many forces in the U.S. have not parted with the hostile attitude toward Vietnam. They are willing to abuse the trade pact to drive out country off its socialist course and to lose its sovereignty.”

In contrast to this negative attitude, political dissidents in Vietnam, especially among retired officials and old revolutionaries are getting bolder and bolder in their demand for human rights, democratization, political pluralism, openness, the elimination of corruption, and the abandonment of socialism and the monopoly of power by the CPV. They are concerned about Chinese ambitions. They support the BTA and favor a closer, even a strategic, relationship with the United States.

At present, the relationship between the United States and Vietnam is a relationship of convenience. Past distrust still weighs heavily in the calculations of both sides. The implementation of the BTA, reform within Vietnam itself, and the way two countries manage the sensitive issues in their relations will have great impact on the future relations between Vietnam and the United States and hence, on Vietnam’s relations with other powers.

[i] Nguyen Manh Cam’s remarks to the External Relations Commission of the Central Committee of the CPV on January 19, 2001 (Voice of Vietnam web site, January 20, 2001; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 22, 2001)

[ii] Resolution of the CPV/CC May 1988

[iii] Speech by General Secretary Le Kha Phieu at the closing of the 11th plenum of the CPV/CC on January 16, 2001 (VNA, January 17, 2001)

[iv] Xinhua, April 22, 2001

[v] Xinhua, April 20, 2001

[vi] Economic Review, (China) February 23, 1999

[vii] Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), June 22, 2000

[viii] Xinhua News, December 20, 2001. Jiang’s “Three Representations” theory maintains that the communist party must “always represent the development needs of China’s advanced productive forces, always represents the outward direction of China’s advanced culture, and always represents the fundamental interest of the largest number of the Chinese people.”

[ix] Jiang Zemin-Nong Duc Manh’s joint statement, December 2, 2001 (VNA, December 4, 2001)

[x] Xinhua News Agency, December 4, 2001

[xi] Xinhua News, February 27, 2002

[xii] Vietnam News Agency (VNA), May 27.

[xiii] Stratfor, April 20, 2000

[xiv] Sai Gon Giai Phong, February 10; Agence France Press, February 10

[xv] AFP, February 13

[xvi] Reuters, April 16

[xvii] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 20, 2001

[xviii] South China Morning Post (SCMP), December 4, 1999

[xix] Thong Luan, No 152, October 2001, p.9. According to sources in Hanoi, in 1967, when North Vietnam needed Chinese military aid to prepare for its Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, China built a railroad station located one kilometer beyond the Nam Quan gate to transport aid to North Vietnam. Eventually, the Nam Quan gate was absorbed into Chinese territory. The land border agreement of 1999 legalized the loss of this historic site to China.

[xx] Thong Luan, No 153, November 2001, pp. 4-8

[xxi] Interview with Le Cong Phung, VASC Orient, January 28, 2002

[xxii] Tass, May 4, 2001

[xxiii] Reuters, February 27, 2001

[xxiv] Russia helped build and gave preferential loan for the construction of Dung Quat oil refinery complex in Central Vietnam after Western companies, including France’s Total, withdrew its investment commitment.

[xxv] Reuters, March 1, 2001

[xxvi] BBC Worldwide Monitoring, February 28, 2001

[xxvii] AFP, February 28, 2001

[xxviii] BBC World Monitoring Reports, January 21, 2002

[xxix] TASS, March 27, 2002

[xxx] Interfax News Agency, November 11, 2001

[xxxi] AFP, February 10, 2002

[xxxii] AFP, February 10 and 24, 2002

[xxxiii] Xinhua, February 1, 2002

[xxxiv] FEER, June 22, 2000

[xxxv] Kyodo News Service, Mary 17, 2002

[xxxvi] Reuters, November 10

[xxxvii] SCMP, January 30, 2001

[xxxviii] AFP, April 8, 2001

[xxxix] Reuters, April 20, 2001

[xl] Xinhua, May 19, 2001

[xli] Nguyen Tan Dung’s speech at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, December 12, 2001

Source: Southeast Asian Affairs 2004
Publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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